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Human sociality depends upon the benefits of mutual aid and extensive
communication. However mutual aid is made difficult by the problems
of coordinating diverse norms and preferences, and communication is
harried by substantial ambiguity in meaning. Here we demonstrate that
these two facts can work together to allow cooperation to develop, by the
strategic use of deliberately ambiguous signals, covert signaling. Covert
signaling is the transmission of information that is accurately received by
its intended audience but obscured when perceived by others. Such sig-
nals may allow coordination and enhanced cooperation while also avoid-
ing the alienation or hostile reactions of individuals with different pref-
erences. Although the empirical literature has identified potential mech-
anisms of covert signaling, such as encryption in humor, there is to date
no formal theory of its dynamics. We introduce a novel mathematical
model to assess the conditions under which a covert signaling strategy
will be favored. We show that covert signaling plausibly serves an im-
portant function in facilitating within-group cooperative assortment by
allowing individuals to pair up with similar individuals when possible
and to get along with dissimilar individuals when necessary. This mech-
anism has broad implications for theories of signaling and cooperation,
humor, social identity, and the evolution of human cultural complexity.
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INTRODUCTION
Much of the research on human cooperation has focused on the free-rider
problem: how to maintain cooperation when individuals’ immediate inter-
ests are opposed to those actions that would maximize the total benefits
to the group. However, in many cases individuals’ interests are aligned
rather than opposed, and these mutualistic scenarios may be equally impor-
tant in understanding human social evolution (Skyrms, 2004; Calcott, 2008;
Tomasello et al., 2012; Smaldino, 2014). Even though there are no incentives
for individuals to defect, mutualism is still a dilemma. When individuals
differ in preferences, norms, or goals, the ability to efficiently coordinate
breaks down. Therefore coordinating behavior, and in particular forming
the reliable expectations of partner behavior that make coordination possi-
ble, is essential for the evolution of mutualism (Schelling, 1960).
Take, for example, the Battle of the Sexes game (Luce & Raiffa, 1957), in
which there exist two equivalent Nash equilibria. Each player still prefers
to coordinate rather than go it alone, but has a different idea of how to coor-
dinate best. Each player would be better off finding another co-player with
more aligned interests. Human societies are replete with dilemmas of this
kind (Boyd & Richerson, 1994), and the need to coordinate extends to other
forms of collective action as well (Ostrom, 2000). Institutional mechanisms
like punishment effectively convert other social dilemmas into coordination
dilemmas, expanding their importance for understanding human sociality.
How can individuals assort on the basis of similarity in preferences, norms,
goals, or strategies? Often these traits are difficult or impossible to directly
observe. When preferences and norms are consciously held, individuals
can merely signal their preferences. But often individuals are not conscious
of their norms and preferences or realize their relevance too late to signal
them.
One solution is the evolution of ethnic marking. Anthropologists have
long recognized the importance of ethnic markers or tags in signaling group
membership to improve cooperative outcomes (Barth, 1969), and in recent
years an extensive formal literature has developed exploring how these ar-
bitrary signals can facilitate assortment on unconscious norms and pref-
erences (Nettle & Dunbar, 1997; Castro & Toro, 2007; Efferson et al., 2008;
Mace & Holden, 2005; McElreath et al., 2003; Moffett, 2013).
Language style and content can serve as a marker for social coordination
(Nettle & Dunbar, 1997). However it is striking that much communication
is ambiguous. Is this ambiguity merely the result of constraints on the accu-
racy of communication? Here we propose that such ambiguity may serve to
facilitate coordination and thereby enhance cooperation within human soci-
eties. A basic problem with unambiguous signals is that they may foreclose
less coordinated partnerships that may be of value in different contexts. In
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some situations, such as frequent or long-term endeavors, one is best served
by engaging in homophilic assortment with a small set of similar partners
who afford relatively more efficient coordination of behavior. In other con-
texts, different assortment outcomes may be desired, such as larger-scale
cooperation for communal defense, differently-skilled partners for gains in
trade, or when vying for the assistance of high-status individuals in po-
litical advancement. While overt signals of personal qualities like ethnic
markers are useful in some contexts, where the adaptive problem is to de-
limit a set of partners who subscribe to the same broad behavioral norms
and to categorically avoid interaction with those who do not, the “all-or-
nothing” character of such signals makes them inadequate for dealing with
assortment within the groups delineated by these markers. Individuals will
often benefit from not “burning bridges” with less similar group members,
so as to be able to draw on them for cooperation in other contexts. A signal-
ing system that enables group members to communicate relative similarity
only when similarity is high while retaining a shroud of ambiguity when
similarity is low would facilitate assortment when the situation allows for
it and still enable low-similarity assortment when the situation demands it.
Here we analyze the evolution of cooperative assortment by a form of
signaling which satisfies these requirements and is known empirically to
exist in nearly all human societies. Covert signaling is the transmission
of information that is accurately received by its intended audience but ob-
scured when perceived by others. It may naı¨vely appear that communi-
cation should have clarity as its goal. However, purposeful ambiguity is
often strategic, allowing signalers both flexibility and plausible deniabil-
ity (Eisenberg, 1984; Pinker et al., 2008). Leaders may use ambiguous lan-
guage to rally diverse followers under a common banner (Eisenberg, 1984),
politicians may use vague platforms to avoid committing to specific policies
(Aragone`s & Neeman, 2000), and would-be suitors may mask their flirta-
tions to be viewed innocuously if their affections are unreciprocated (Ger-
sick & Kurzban, 2014). What these discussions of ambiguity have in com-
mon is the assumption that all receivers will find the signals to be equally
vague. In contrast, our discussion focuses on signals that will be clearer
for some receivers and more ambiguous for others. A common example is
“dog-whistle politics” (Lo´pez, 2014), in which statements have one mean-
ing for the public at large and a more specialized meaning for others. Such
language attempts to transmit a coded message while alienating the fewest
listeners possible.
A more precise and possibly much more common form of covert, within-
group signaling is humor (Flamson & Barrett, 2008; Flamson & Bryant,
2013). According to the encryption model of humor, a necessary component
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of humorous production is the presence of multiple, divergent understand-
ings of speaker meaning, some of which are dependent on access to implicit
information. Only those listeners who share access to this information can
“decrypt” the implicit understandings and understand the joke. Because
the successful production of a joke requires access to that implicit informa-
tion, humor behaves in manner similar to “digital signatures” in computer
cryptography, verifying the speaker’s access to that information without
explicitly stating it. By not explicitly declaring one’s position within local
variation, but instead signaling and assessing similarity on the basis of sub-
tle and iterated cues that only like-minded group members can detect, indi-
viduals can engage in positive assortment in some contexts without burn-
ing bridges with potential allies in others. While not all humor necessarily
has this form or function, a substantial amount of spontaneous, natural hu-
mor does (Flamson & Barrett, 2008; Flamson & Bryant, 2013).
Covert signaling can also facilitate assortment along dimensions of sim-
ilarity more nuanced than discrete types or groups, which is a common re-
striction of ethnic markers or tags as they are typically discussed (McElreath
et al., 2003; Antal et al., 2009; Cohen & Haun, 2013; Hammond & Axelrod,
2006). Jokes and other encrypted signals of identity can convey rich in-
formation about an individual’s beliefs, goals, personality, proclivities, and
history. Although any two individuals within a group should be able to co-
operate when it is mutually beneficial to do so, pairs who are more similar
along these trait dimensions should cooperate more effectively, generating
larger benefits.
We propose that, by avoiding burned bridges, covert signaling serves
an important function in facilitating cooperative assortment within groups
by allowing individuals to pair up with similar individuals when possible
and with dissimilar individuals when necessary. In the remainder of this
paper, we precisely define the strategic logic of covert signaling in the con-
text of opportunities for social assortment and coordination. We analyze
the conditions for covert signaling to be preferred over overt signaling, in
which information about an individual’s traits is more transparent. Covert
signaling is not always favored. For example, if it is possible to choose co-
operative partners from a very large pool, overt signaling may be a more
advantageous means of communication, as individuals will both avoid be-
ing paired with dissimilar partners and reap the added benefits that comes
from knowing that a similarity exists (Chwe, 2001). However, covert signal-
ing often will be favored. It sacrifices maximal transparency for the sake
of maintaining working relationships with dissimilar individuals. Covert
signaling therefore may be an important part of a full explanation of both
specific forms of communication and coordination, such as coded speech
and humor, as well as the flexibility of human sociality more generally.
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MODEL DESCRIPTION
We consider a large population of individuals who are generally coop-
erative toward one another. That is, we assume they have already solved
the first-order cooperation problem of suppressing free riders, and can in-
stead focus on maximizing the benefit generated by cooperation (Skyrms,
2004; Calcott, 2008; Tomasello et al., 2012; Smaldino, 2014). Although in-
dividuals all belong to the same large group, they vary along many trait
dimensions and thus share more in common with some individuals than
others. Pairs of individuals whose trait profiles overlap to some threshold
degree are deemed similar (S). Otherwise they are deemed dissimilar (–S).
Pairs of similar individuals can more effectively coordinate, and so can ob-
tain higher payoffs from cooperation. The probability that two randomly
selected individuals will have similar trait profiles is given by s.
Individuals signal information about their trait profiles to the other mem-
bers of the group for the purposes of facilitating future cooperative assort-
ment. When a signal is successfully received, the recipient will update his
disposition towards the sender, coming to like an individual whose signal
indicates similarity and to dislike an individual whose signal indicates dis-
similarity. When no signal is received, individuals maintain a neutral dis-
position toward the sender, reflecting uncertainty about their mutual sim-
ilarity. Disposition is assumed to influence the effectiveness of assortment
in addition to the influence of similarity: individuals who like each other
can generate an even greater mutual benefit, while individuals who dislike
each other are impaired.
Occasionally, individuals require assistance in a cooperative task, and at-
tempt to form temporary cooperative partnerships to accomplish it. There
are two distinct contexts: free choice and forced choice scenarios. In a free
choice scenario, an individual has access to several members of her group
from among whom she can choose a favored partner. In contrast, in a forced
choice scenario, an individual must seek help from whomever happens to
be around. Under these circumstances, it may be important not to have
burned bridges, since this will limit the likelihood of effective coordination.
The population dynamics consist of two stages: communication and co-
operation.
Communication. Each individual i holds a disposition toward every other
individual j. In the absence of any information about j’s trait profile, this
disposition is neutral (N). If i receives a signal from j indicating similarity,
this disposition will update to liking (L). If, on the other hand, i receives a
signal indicating dissimilarity, the disposition will update to disliking (D).
At the beginning of each generation, all individuals communicate infor-
mation about their trait profiles to the members of the group. Individuals
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are either overt (O) or covert (C) signalers. Overt signalers attempt to be un-
derstood by all members of the population, and their signals are received
by each individual with probability r. With probability 1− r a transmission
error occurs, such as the receiver simply being out of the room when the sig-
nal was sent. Covert signalers share information about their trait profiles
in such a way that it is obscured to dissimilar individuals and will only
ever be received by similar individuals; they are therefore never actively
disliked. However, covert signals are also more likely to be missed by their
intended audience, such as when a joke falls flat, and so covert signals are
received by similar individuals with probability γr, where γ represents the
probability that a covert signal will be understood. After individuals signal
about their trait profiles, all dispositions are updated in light of information
received.
Cooperation. Each individual is equally likely to seek out a cooperative
partner at any given time, and so we can focus on the expected outcome for
any particular cooperative scenario. With probability δ the need for coop-
eration is “dire” and the individual is forced to request cooperation from
whomever is on hand. This will be an individual selected at random, as we
assume high levels of mixing within the population. Otherwise, the indi-
vidual can freely choose among a randomly sampled group of m individu-
als, representing the subset of currently available partners (a more general
case of the model is possible in which two sample sizes are available for
forced- and free-choice conditions, and is explored in the Appendix). An
individual does not have direct access to information about her similarity
to potential partners, but only to information about their disposition to-
ward her. An individual has a strong preference for partners who like her,
followed by individuals with a neutral disposition toward her, and only
selecting a partner who dislikes her as a last resort.
There is no incentive to defect or refuse cooperation, and so individu-
als always grant requests for cooperation. However, the payoffs resulting
from cooperative tasks are influenced by both similarity and disposition.
There are four possible payoff outcomes. First, if the individual request-
ing assistance is disliked (D, which only occurs when the two individuals
are dissimilar), cooperation will be least coordinated, and the payoff will
be minimal. We set this baseline payoff to zero without loss of generality.
Second, if the disposition of the requested partner is neutral (N), the pay-
off depends entirely on similarity. We set the marginal benefit of not being
disliked equal to one. This is the payoff received by dissimilar (−S) individ-
uals when the requestee’s disposition toward the requester is neutral (N).
Third, the marginal benefit of being similar (S) in the same circumstance is
given by α. Note that this benefit does not have to present itself consciously;
similar individuals may simply coordinate better by virtue of having more
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in common. Finally, being liked (L, which also implies similarity) generates
an additional marginal benefit, β. This benefit might result from increased
enthusiasm for the task given that each individual is working with some-
one they like, or because simply knowing about their similarity further in-
creases their ability to coordinate (Chwe, 2001). Formally, these payoffs are
represented as follows:
V(D) = 0, V(N,−S) = 1, (1)
V(N, S) = 1+ α, V(L) = 1+ α+ β.
Fitness calculations. Using the probability of each partnership character-
ized by the four possible combinations of similarity and disposition, we
calculated the expected payoffs to overt and covert individuals. Our model
is indifferent to whether these payoffs represent biological fitness or rather
some welfare effect relevant to cultural replicator dynamics.
The nature of our model affords two particular mathematical conveniences
in terms of payoff calculations. First, the probability of receiving a signal is
independent of the receiver’s own signaling strategy, and cooperative be-
havior is similarly independent of the requestee’s signaling strategy. There
are therefore no frequency-dependent effects. Second, requests for coop-
eration are always granted, so requestees obtain the same payoffs as re-
questers. We can therefore ignore payoffs to requestees in payoff calcula-
tions.
The fitness of each signaling strategy is a function of the seven model
parameters (see Table 1). The full derivation is given in the Appendix. The
fitness of an overt signaler is
W(O) = δ [srβ+ sα+ 1− r(1− s)] (2)
+ (1− δ) [(1− (1− sr)m) (1+ α+ β)
+ ((1− sr)m − (r− sr)m) (sα+ 1)] ,
and the fitness of a covert signaler is
W(C) = δ [sγrβ+ sα+ 1] (3)
+ (1− δ) [(1− (1− sγr)m) (1+ α+ β)
+(1− sγr)m−1 (s(1− γr)(1+ α) + 1− s)
]
.
Covert signaling is favored whenever W(C) > W(O). This inequality can
be rearranged with all parameters on the lefthand side and zero on the
right. Covert agents will have a higher fitness than overt agents if and only
8 SMALDINO, FLAMSON, & MCELREATH
if
δr [sβ(γ− 1) + 1− s] (4)
+ (1− δ)(1+ α+ β) [(1− sr)m − (1− sγr)m]
+ (1− δ)(1− sγr)m−1 [s(1− γr)(1+ α) + 1− s]
− (1− δ) [(1− sr)m − (r− sr)m] (1+ sα) > 0.
The remainder of this paper is an explanation of what this inequality im-
plies for the evolution of covert signaling. We take a two-pass approach to
our analysis. First, we explore certain instructive cases for which intuitive
analytical solutions are apparent. We follow this with numerical analyses
to more fully characterize the model’s behavior.
RESULTS
Due to the structure of the payoff expressions, the dynamics of this sys-
tem always lead to dominance by one signaling strategy or the other. One
strategy or the other is favored at all frequencies. Therefore we seek condi-
tions for covert signaling to dominate.
Covert signaling is favored by forced choice (δ > 0), the ability to reliably
transmit covert signals (γ > 0), and when the population is sufficiently
variable (s < 1). These relationships are perhaps unsurprising, but the
interactions among these factors can be complex, showing how even highly
error-prone covert signals may evolve. In addition, the size of the pool of
interaction partners, m, has a complex but ultimately intuitive relationship
to the success of the covert strategy.
If the scenario is always forced-choice (δ = 1). When choice is always
forced, and assuming r > 0 so that some signals of both types are received,
covert signaling dominates when:
1− s
s
> β(1− γ) (5)
The left side of the inequality is the odds of interacting with a dissimilar
individual. The right side is the expected difference in marginal payoffs be-
tween overt and covert signaling when cooperating with a similar individ-
ual. Since covert signaling is prone to error 1− γ of the time, these errors
reduce the range of conditions that favor covert signaling. If covert and
overt signals are received with equal probability (i.e., γ = 1), then covert
signaling will always be favored. However, errors can be very common
without displacing covert signaling, provided dissimilarity is sufficiently
common and the benefit β is not too large. We explore these relationships
more thoroughly in the next section.
It should be noted that the situation when δ = 1 is logically equivalent to
one in which δ < 1 but m = 1; that is, the number of individuals sampled
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under free choice conditions is one. This is also true algebraically. As choice
becomes freer (i.e. 0 ≤ δ < 1 and m > 1), it becomes possible for overt
signalers to dominate under a larger range of conditions.
If the sample group is very large (m  1). The same relationship among
these basic factors arises in very large groups. In this case, whenever the
situation is free choice, an individual will have a large group of possible
partners from which to choose. The fitness of overt and covert individuals
can then be approximated as follows:
W(O) ≈ δ [srβ+ sα+ 1− r(1− s)] + (1− δ)(1+ α+ β), (6)
W(C) ≈ δ [sγrβ+ sα+ 1] + (1− δ)(1+ α+ β). (7)
When groups are large, both strategies have equal fitness under free choice,
because they can always find a similar partner who likes them. If δ > 0,
then the ability of covert signaling to dominate depends entirely on having
a higher payoff under forced choice. The difference W(C)−W(O) is:
1− s
s
> β(1− γ) (8)
which is identical to Eq. 5.
It is an important result that covert signals can be highly noisy but still
evolve. To demonstrate how noisy, we can re-write the condition for the
dominance of covert signaling as the efficacy needed to overcome the ben-
efit β of being liked, for a given threshold of similarity s, as
γ > 1−
(
1− s
s
)
1
β
(9)
We plot this inequality in Figure 1. If γ = 1, so that covert signaling is as
effective as overt signaling, then covert signaling will always dominate for
large m as long as δ > 0. For imperfect covert signaling, noisier signals must
be compensated by smaller benefits to being liked. If the benefit of being
liked is sufficiently high, covert signaling cannot evolve. This relationship
is also influenced by the threshold for similarity, s, or the probability that
two randomly selected individuals will be sufficiently similar to generate
enhanced coordination. When most individuals are similar, overt signaling
is favored under a wide range of conditions, because there are many op-
portunities to reap the rewards of being liked and few opportunities to be
disliked. Conversely, when similar individuals are rare, covert signaling is
favored under a wider range of conditions, because pairings with dissim-
ilar individuals will be common and it will therefore pay to avoid having
burned bridges.
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FIGURE 1. The minimal value of γ needed for the evolution
of covert signaling as a function of β for several values of
s. The shaded regions reflect values for which covert signal-
ing dominates. This analysis assumes that δ > 0 and m is
very large, so that free-choice scenarios always result in the
maximal cooperative benefit for either signaling strategy.
Restrictions on partner choice are commonplace, and the ability to choose
a cooperative partner from among the entire population under normal cir-
cumstances is unrealistic. We therefore constrain the rest of our analysis to
more arbitrary values of m.
Arbitrary group sizes. As noted previously, a scenario where m = 1 is
equivalent to δ = 1, in which case covert signaling is strongly favored. As m
increases, the payoff difference between overt and covert signaling changes
in a non-monotonic fashion, initially increasing sharply and then decreas-
ing more gradually (Figure 2). What accounts for this non-monotonic rela-
tionship with group size?
When m = 1, all interactions are with random individuals. As m begins
to increase, overt signalers gain an advantage, as they become better able to
assort with similar individuals who like them. In free-choice scenarios, in-
dividuals can choose their interaction partners from a sample of size m. In
these cases, overt signalers can more effectively sort similar from dissimilar
individuals, making it both more likely that an individual can pair with a
similar partner, and more likely that that partner will actively like the in-
dividual based on signaled common interests. This advantage is especially
pronounced when overall communication rates are low and covert signals
are highly error-prone.
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(δ)(a) r = 0.3 (b) (c)r = 0.7 r = 1.0
FIGURE 2. Triptych plot depicting critical values of δ, above
which covert signaling dominates, as a function of the sam-
ple group size, m. The shape of each curve varies with the
values of the communication parameters, r and γ. Here,
s = 0.5, α = 1, β = 1.
In forced-choice scenarios, on the other hand, overt signalers risk being
paired with a partner whom they have previously alienated, while covert
signalers can avoid this fate because dissimilar individuals will remain neu-
tral toward them. In absolute terms, however, it is better for everyone when
forced-choice scenarios are rare, because this increases the likelihood of an
individual being paired with a similar partner who likes them. So, every-
one’s fitness decreases as forced-choice scenarios become more common,
but the rate at which this occurs is lower for covert signalers, who are bet-
ter equipped to successfully coordinate in these situations. Thus, as δ in-
creases, there is often a critical value above which the fitness of covert sig-
nalers is greater than that of overt signalers (Figure 3). The precise value of
this critical δ depends on the other model parameters.
As a consequence, as m continues to increase, the marginal benefit to
overt signalers’ fitness declines as their payoffs reach an asymptote. Figure
4 illustrates that fitness for both strategies increases with m, but at different
rates. For large enough m, both signaling strategies can effectively assort
in free-choice situations, and the marginal advantage to covert signalers in
forced-choice scenarios becomes the deciding factor.
Figure 2 shows the non-monotonic relationship of the threshold frequency
of forced choice δ against group size m. The effectiveness of communica-
tion parameters r and γ are also varied, demonstrating their large influence
on the evolution of covert signaling. Overt signaling is most favored when
covert signaling is noisy (γ 1) and communications rates are low (r  1).
This is more clearly shown in Figure 5, which plots δ against r for three val-
ues of γ.
It is obvious that covert signalers should fare better when their signals
are more likely to be received, i.e. when γ is large. Less obvious is why
12 SMALDINO, FLAMSON, & MCELREATH
W(O)
W(C)
��� ��� ��� ��� ��� ������
���
���
���
���
����������� �� ������ ������ (δ)
�
���
��
�
FIGURE 3. The fitness of overt signalers, W(O), and covert
signalers, W(C), as a function of the probability of a forced-
choice scenario. This plot is merely illustrative, as the slope
and intercepts of both lines depends on the remaining model
parameters. Here, s = 0.5, r = 1, γ = 0.5, m = 5, α = 1,
β = 1.
overt signalers should have an advantage when communication rates are
low across the board. When r is small, information is rare, and hence access
to information is at a premium. Overt signalers create higher-information
environments, and as such are better at avoiding dissimilar partners and
reaping the rewards of being liked by their cooperative partners. As signal-
ing becomes more effective, both signaling strategies can manage to iden-
tify similar individuals and it becomes more important to avoid alienating
the dissimilar individuals whom one might encounter. Covert signaling is
thus favored in environments where it is easy to send signals to potential
interaction partners.
No benefits to being similar or liked. Covert signaling succeeds by not
burning bridges with dissimilar cooperative partners. A stark demonstra-
tion of this is to note that covert signaling dominates when there are no
marginal benefits to either similarity or liking, when α = β = 0. In this
case, the only difference in payoffs between signaling strategies stems from
their ability to avoid being disliked. Here, covert signalers are at a clear
advantage — they are never disliked, and their expected fitness payoff is
simply equal to one, the payoff from cooperating with someone who does
not dislike them. Overt signalers, on the other hand, have payoffs that are
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FIGURE 4. The fitness of overt signalers, W(O), and covert
signalers, W(C), as a function of the sample group size, illus-
trating non-monotonicity of values supporting the evolution
of covert signaling. Here, s = 0.5, δ = 0.4, r = 0.7, γ = 0.7,
α = 1, β = 1.
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FIGURE 5. Critical values of δ, above which covert signaling
dominates, as a function of the communication rate, r, for
several values of the efficacy of covert signaling, γ. Here,
s = 0.5, m = 10, α = 1, β = 1.
diminished exactly by their probability of encountering a dissimilar indi-
vidual who received their signal and therefore dislikes them:
W(O) = δ [1− r(1− s)] + (1− δ) [1− [r(1− s)]m] (10)
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FIGURE 6. Critical values of α and β, below which covert
signaling dominates and above which overt signaling dom-
inates. For all plots, m = 10 and r = 0.7. (a) Plot for several
values of δ, with γ = 0.7 and s = 0.5. (b) Plot for several
values of γ, with δ = 0.8 and s = 0.5. (c) Plot for several val-
ues of s, with δ = 0.8 and γ = 0.7. Please note the increased
ranges on both axes.
The above is always less than one. Covert signaling is always favored under
these conditions.
If the benefits to being similar or (especially) being liked are sufficiently
high, covert signaling cannot evolve (Figure 6), because overt signalers are
better at assorting with similar individuals and communicating that simi-
larity so that awareness can generate additional benefits. If the marginal
payoff for being liked (β) is relatively small, then covert signaling can gen-
erally evolve for what are probably reasonable values for the marginal pay-
off for similarity, α. Recall that in the population we are modeling, everyone
is similar to some degree, and that the baseline value of neutral cooperation
is one. Values of α many times greater than one may therefore be unlikely.
The critical values of α and β are highly dependent on the probability that
a scenario will be forced-choice, δ, and on the efficacy of covert signaling,
γ. If either of those latter parameters are low, covert signaling is favored
for a narrower range of additional benefits. The critical values of α and β
also depend on the likelihood that random pairs of individuals are similar.
When most individuals are similar, overt signaling dominates whenever
the marginal benefit for being liked, β, is only slightly larger than the base-
line benefit for not being disliked. In contrast, when similar individuals
are rare, β must be very large to overcome the benefits to covert signaling
(Figure 6c).
DISCUSSION
The dynamics of cooperation are more complicated than implied by mod-
els in which maximal benefits accrue to those who can simply avoid free
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riders. Not all cooperators are equal. Individuals vary, making assortment
among cooperators important. Circumstances also vary. When individuals
must occasionally collaborate with those outside their circles of friends, it
can be critical to avoid burning bridges with dissimilar members of one’s
group. Covert signaling makes this possible, and this may be why it is
sometimes observed in human societies, at both small and large scales.
We have shown that covert signaling is strongly favored when average
similarity is low, when “dire” situations (in which partner choice is forced)
are common, or when the marginal benefit to coordinating (being “liked”)
is small. We have also shown that covert signaling can be favored even
when it is less effective than overt signaling at communicating similarity,
because it simultaneously avoids communicating dissimilarity.
Our model also points to interesting transitions from inter- to intra-group
assortment dynamics. As noted above, overt signaling systems are favored
when the marginal benefit of being liked — of working with similar oth-
ers who are aware of that similarity, denoted here as β — is several times
greater than the baseline benefit of cooperating with a dissimilar and neu-
tral partner. This is precisely the kind of situation that is assumed to obtain
in inter-group assortment, where overt signals such as ethnic markers are
used to discriminate between similar and dissimilar individuals. In these
between-group contexts, the difference between similar and dissimilar in-
dividuals is so great that attempting to coordinate with dissimilar others is
not worth the effort, and one can afford to burn bridges with them in order
to ensure that similar others are aware of their similarity McElreath et al.
(2003). In fact, it might be argued that burning bridges with dissimilar out-
group members is as much a goal of overt signals like ethnic markers as is
attracting similar in-group members.
Intra-group assortment, however, is not simply a matter of scaling down
inter-group dynamics. In this case, we must already presume some base-
line level of similarity resulting from inter-group assortment; for there to be
a group within which to assort, some degree of similarity should already
be in place that defines that group, such as the shared interaction norms,
communication systems, etc. that ethnic markers are thought to ensure.
The benefits of further assorting on the basis of more nuanced similarity
are therefore likely to be marginal relative to random assortment within the
group. In terms of our model parameters, very large α or β favor overt sig-
naling because they bring us out of the domain of intra-group assortment to
that of inter-group assortment. With less dramatic marginal benefits, how-
ever, the costs of burning bridges with dissimilar group members make
covert signaling worthwhile.
Relatedly, we emphasize that the probability of similarity, s, need not re-
flect some number of discrete types in the population, but can instead refer
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to a level of selectivity in how much a given pair of individuals needs to
have in common in order to be considered “similar.” That is, s refers to the
proportion of the population that would be considered similar to a focal in-
dividual in a given context, with higher values indicating a looser concept
of “similar” than lower ones (e.g., s = 0.7 indicates that the individuals are
choosing partners on the basis of whatever criteria would include the 70%
of the group that are most similar to them). As Figure 6c illustrates, changes
to s can have a significant impact on the overall dynamics of the system,
because s essentially defines the concept of “similarity.” When s = 1, 100%
of individuals within the group will be considered “similar,” and the only
useful signals will be overt ethnic markers that allow individuals to avoid
dissimilar out-group members. As s decreases, the criteria for consider-
ing a potential partner sufficiently similar to reap the benefits of enhanced
coordination become stricter, as individuals deem a smaller proportion of
the group worthy of homophilic assortment. The utility of covert signals
increases as people become more choosy.
An interesting direction for future exploration is how these dynamics
might respond to increased social complexity. In the larger and more com-
plex societies associated with the development of agriculture, and particu-
larly in the last few centuries, interactions with strangers have been increas-
ingly frequent, necessitating strategies for temporary assortment (Johnson
& Earle, 2000; Smaldino, 2016). In large, diverse populations, highly simi-
lar individuals should be rare, while the need for large scale cooperation in
collective endeavors such as warfare, politics, or commerce would make it
costly to burn bridges with these variously dissimilar partners. It is there-
fore likely that increases in social complexity would select for more complex
covert signaling strategies.
For example, within complex industrialized societies, individuals often
use Gestalt descriptions connoting a suite of information about the sort
of person they are, which we call “social identities.” Identity signaling,
whether through overt social markers or through more covert communi-
cation, can be used by individuals looking to find others similar to them-
selves and to avoid being mistaken for something they are not (Smaldino,
2016; Berger & Heath, 2008). If the need to cooperate with dissimilar indi-
viduals is unlikely or if similar individuals are common, then overt declara-
tions of identity should be expected. On the other hand, if burning bridges
is both costly and likely given an overt signaling strategy, we should ex-
pect the relevant identity to be signaled much more subtly. There may be
layers to how identity is signaled, with increasing levels of specificity sig-
naled in increasingly covert ways, and without all received signals actively
inducing a disposition of either liking or disliking toward the sender. A
related signaling strategy, not covered by our model, might facilitate liking
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between similar individuals but only indifference otherwise. Using these
“semi-covert” signals, individuals would be aware of failures to match, but
simply not care. Casual, coarse-grain identity signaling may often take this
form, as in cases of fashion adoption or pop culture allegiances. It would
be interesting to investigate how common these kind of semi-covert signals
are in small-scale communities, as they seem pervasive in complex indus-
trialized societies.
Ours is the first model of covert signaling. As such, it necessarily in-
volves simplifying assumptions concerning the nature of signaling and co-
operative assortment. For example, while we have allowed for covert sig-
naling errors in the form of failed transmission to similar individuals, we
have not included the converse form of error, where dissimilar individuals
are able to detect the signal some of the time, and therefore update their
disposition to disliking the covert signaler. Adding an additional parame-
ter to account for this possibility does not qualitatively change our analysis.
But it does create conditions where a non-signaling “quiet” strategy could
invade; see the Appendix for further discussion. In addition, we ignore the
possibility of strategic action on the part of the receiver to either improve
coordination or to avoid partnering with dissimilar individuals entirely. We
assumed that a pairing of dissimilar partners would simply lead to an un-
successful collaboration, but such a pairing might instead lead each indi-
vidual to pursue more individualistic interests. At the population level, we
assumed that all individuals had an equal probability of encountering simi-
lar individuals, and that all similar and dissimilar individuals were equiva-
lent. In reality, some individuals may be more or less likely to encounter
similar individuals, perhaps related to differences in the tendency to be
conformity- versus distinctiveness-seeking (Smaldino & Epstein, 2015), or
reflecting minority-majority dynamics (Wimmer, 2013). Exploration of this
variation opens the door to evaluating signaling and assortment strategies
in stratified groups. All of these limitations provide avenues for future re-
search that build upon the central findings reported here.
In a population where individuals vary and burning bridges is costly,
overtly announcing precisely where one stands entails venturing into a
zone of danger. Covert signaling, as in the case of humor or otherwise
encrypted language, allows individuals to effectively assort when possible
while avoiding burned bridges when the situation calls for partnerships of
necessity.
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TABLE 1. Global model parameters.
Parameter Definition Range
s Probability of similarity [0, 1]
δ Rate of forced-choice scenarios [0, 1]
m Sample group size Positive integers
r Baseline signaling efficacy [0, 1]
γ Relative efficacy of covert signaling [0, 1]
α Marginal payoff of similarity [0,∞)
β Marginal payoff of being liked [0,∞)
APPENDIX
Covert Signaling Evolves By Avoiding Burned Bridges
1. FITNESS CALCULATIONS
Here we calculate the expected payoffs to overt and covert agents (see
Table 1 for model parameters). First, some notation. We represent the
probability of being liked by a randomly selected partner as Pr(L|O) for
an overt signaler and Pr(L|C) for a covert signaler, with similar notation
for disliking. The probability of an overt signaler randomly encountering a
similar individual with a neutral disposition toward her will be written as
Pr(N, S|O), and the probability of an overt agent randomly encountering a
dissimilar individual with a neutral disposition toward her will be written
as Pr(N,−S|O). Likewise for covert signalers.
For random interactions, such as those that occur under forced-choice
conditions, the following are key probabilities:
Pr(L|O) = sr (11)
Pr(L|C) = sγr (12)
Pr(N, S|O) = s(1− r) (13)
Pr(N, S|C) = s(1− γr) (14)
Pr(N,−S|O) = (1− s)(1− r) (15)
Pr(N,−S|C) = (1− s) (16)
Pr(D|O) = (1− s)r (17)
Pr(D|C) = 0 (18)
For free-choice situations, we will need terms such as the probability of
being liked by at least one agent in a set of m randomly selected individu-
als. For an event which occurs with probability q, the general solution to
this kind of problem – i.e., the probability of at least one occurrence of the
event in m draws – is equivalent to one minus the probability of zero draws:
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1− (1− q)m. Let Pr(L1(m)|O) denote the probability that at least one indi-
vidual in a set of m likes the focal individual, given that the focal individual
is an overt signaler. This works out to be:
Pr(L1(m)|O) = 1− (1− Pr(L|O))m (19)
for overt signalers, and similar for covert signalers. For notational simplic-
ity, we’ll drop the m, so that Pr(L1|O) = Pr(L1(m)|O).
To calculate the fitness of overt signalers, we need the following:
Pr(L1|O) = 1− (1− sr)m (20)
Pr(N|O) = 1− r (21)
Pr(N1|O) = 1− rm (22)
We also need the joint probability that, given a sample group of m indi-
viduals, there are zero individuals that like the focal individual and at least
one individual who is neutral toward her. Let us denote the probability that
there are zero individuals in a group of size m that like the focal individual,
given that she is an overt signaler, as Pr(L0(m)|O). For overt signalers, this
joint probability is given by the following, with the “(m)” part omitted for
convenience:
Pr(N1, L0|O) = Pr(N1|L0, O)Pr(L0|O) (23)
=
(
1−
[
1− Pr(N|O)
1− Pr(L|O)
]m)
(1− Pr(L|O))m
=
(
1−
[
1− 1− r
1− sr
]m)
(1− sr)m
= (1− sr)m − [r(1− s)]m
The expected payoff for an overt signaler is therefore given by
W(O) = δ [Pr(L|O)V(L) + Pr(N, S|O)V(N, S) + Pr(N,−S|O)V(N,−S)]
(24)
+ (1− δ) [Pr(L1|O)V(L)
+ Pr(N1, L0|O)
(
Pr(N, S|O)
Pr(N|O) V(N, S) +
Pr(N,−S|O)
Pr(N|O) V(N,−S)
)]
= δ [sr(1+ β) + sα+ (1− r)] + (1− δ) [(1− (1− sr)m) (1+ α+ β)
+ ((1− sr)m − (r− sr)m)
(
s(1− r)
1− r (1+ α) +
(1− s)(1− r)
1− r (1)
)]
,
which reduces to
W(O) = δ [srβ+ sα+ 1− r(1− s)] + (1− δ) [(1− (1− sr)m) (1+ α+ β)
+ ((1− sr)m − (r− sr)m) (sα+ 1)] . (25)
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We take the same approach for covert signalers, noting the added pres-
ence of the parameter γ, the efficacy of covert signaling. In addition to the
probabilities for random interactions given above, we require the following
probabilities for free-choice scenarios:
Pr(L1|C) = 1− (1− sγr)m (26)
Pr(N|C) = 1− sγr (27)
Pr(N1|C) = 1− (sγr)m (28)
We also require the joint probability that a covert signaler encounters zero
individuals who like her and at least one neutrally disposed individual in
a sample group of size m. We derive this here:
Pr(N1, L0|C) =
(
1−
[
1− Pr(N|C)
1− Pr(L|C)
]m)
(1− Pr(L|C)m (29)
=
(
1−
[
1− 1− sγr
1− sγr
]m)
(1− sγr)m
= (1− sγr)m.
The expected fitness for covert agents can now be calculated:
W(C) = δ [Pr(L|C)V(L) + Pr(N, S|C)V(N, S) + Pr(N,−S|C)V(N,−S)]
(30)
+ (1− δ) [Pr(L1|C)V(L)
+ Pr(N1, L0|C)
(
Pr(N, S|C)
Pr(N|C) V(N, S) +
Pr(N,−S|C)
Pr(N|C) V(N,−S)
)]
= δ [sγr(1+ α+ β) + s(1− γr)(1+ α) + 1− s]
+ (1− δ) [(1− (1− sγr)m) (1+ α+ β)
+(1− sγr)m
(
s(1− γr)
1− sγr (1+ α) +
(1− s)
1− sγr (1)
)]
,
which reduces to:
W(C) = δ [sγrβ+ sα+ 1] + (1− δ) [(1− (1− sγr)m) (1+ α+ β)
+(1− sγr)m−1 (s(1− γr)(1+ α) + 1− s)
]
. (31)
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Covert signaling will be favored whenever W(C) > W(O), or when
W(C) −W(O) > 0. Expanding out this inequality, we derive the follow-
ing condition for the evolution of covert signaling:
δr [sβ(γ− 1) + 1− s] (32)
+ (1− δ)(1+ α+ β) [(1− sr)m − (1− sγr)m]
+ (1− δ)(1− sγr)m−1 [s(1− γr)(1+ α) + 1− s]
− (1− δ) [(1− sr)m − (r− sr)m] (1+ sα) > 0.
2. GENERALIZATION TO TWO SAMPLING SCENARIOS
In the model presented in the main text, we contrasted two possible sce-
narios in which individuals required assistance in a cooperative task. Un-
der free-choice conditions, individuals were exposed to a sample group of
m individuals. Although the focal individual could not access information
about similarity directly, she could ascertain the sample individuals’ dispo-
sitions toward her. On the other hand, in forced-choice scenarios, the focal
individual was forced to cooperate with a randomly selected individual.
A more general version of this model is one in which under more favor-
able conditions, a focal individual can select a cooperative partner from a
sample group of m1 individuals, while under less favorable conditions, she
has access to a smaller sample group of size m2, such that m2 ≤ m1. In this
case, the expected fitness for overt signalers is given by
W(O) = δ [(1− (1− sr)m2) (1+ α+ β) (33)
+ ((1− sr)m2 − (r− sr)m2) (sα+ 1)]
+ (1− δ) [(1− (1− sr)m1) (1+ α+ β)
+ ((1− sr)m1 − (r− sr)m1) (sα+ 1)] .
The expected fitness for covert signalers is similarly given by
W(C) = δ [(1− (1− sγr)m2) (1+ α+ β) (34)
+(1− sγr)m2−1 (s(1− γr)(1+ α) + 1− s)
]
+ (1− δ) [(1− (1− sγr)m1) (1+ α+ β)
+(1− sγr)m1−1 (s(1− γr)(1+ α) + 1− s)
]
.
The model in the main text is recovered when m2 = 1.
3. QUIET: COMPARISON TO A STRATEGY OF NON-SIGNALING
Consider a type of strategic agent in our model that communicates no
information about herself to others. She will never be disliked, nor will she
be liked. This is equivalent to imagining a covert signaler whose signaling
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efficacy is γ = 0. From the equation for the fitness of covert agents, it is
easy to show that the expected payoff to these “quiet” (Q) agents is simply
W(Q) = 1+ sα. (35)
Because quiet agents communicate no information, they interact with sim-
ilar partners only by chance, with a probability equal to the prevalence of
similar individuals in the population.
For our model, it is clear that, as long as γ > 0, covert agents will outper-
form quiet agents — i.e., W(C) > W(Q) — because covert agents similarly
avoid being disliked but are better able to assort with similar partners and
occasionally reap the rewards of being liked. The quiet strategy therefore
represents a lower bound to the fitness of covert signaling. As our inten-
tion is to explore the conditions under which covert signaling is favored,
we therefore do not investigate the quiet strategy in further detail here.
In the model presented in this paper, we assumed that all transmission
errors were ones of omission; that is, those in which a signal failed to ei-
ther transmit or be received. However, one can also imagine situations
in which covert signals are occasionally detected by dissimilar individuals,
such as when someone understands a derogatory joke, but does not share
the speaker’s stance towards the targets. This could result in covert sig-
nalers suffering the same cost of being disliked as overt signalers, and cre-
ating conditions under which it would be preferable to remain silent rather
than attempting to signal covertly. An analysis of such a model, in which
overt, covert, and quiet strategies could all compete, is beyond the scope
of the present paper, but is a target for research from our group in the near
future.
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